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R. v Donald Marshall Jr., 1993-19961
BETWEEN NOVEMBER 1993 AND JUNE 1996, my life became enmeshed in a
court case involving fishing and the sale of fish by a Mi’kmaq resident of Nova
Scotia, Donald Marshall Jr. The court case resulted from charges brought against Mr.
Marshall by the federal government for not abiding by the regulatory system
administered by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans [DFO]. According to the
Mi’kmaq community, however, fishing and selling fish is a right implicitly
recognized in a chain of treaties signed with the British Crown between 1725 and
1779. Since these treaties are protected under section 35 of Canada’s 1982
Constitution, the Mi’kmaq community felt that Mr. Marshall was not violating a
federal statute but exercising his constitutional rights. This interpretation was not
shared by federal authorities. Though the government recognized that the Constitution
protected “existing aboriginal and treaty rights”, it argued that further clarifications
were needed to determine what rights stemmed from the treaties made with the
Mi’kmaq. Since the Supreme Court of Canada had not yet provided such
clarifications, lawyers representing the Mi’kmaq community and the federal
government began a protracted legal proceeding in which they asked the court to
define the Mi’kmaq community’s treaty rights in relation to the commercial fishery,
and specifically whether that “right” was subject to DFO regulation.
Over the last 20 to 30 years, a number of scholars have provided the courts with
their opinion on historical issues. Some have written about their experiences, focusing
principally upon the difficulties of explaining the past to an “audience” whose
discipline is governed by a different set of rules.2 This commentary has sometimes
involved a critique of the judiciary for either rejecting or misinterpreting academic
opinions, a viewpoint most often advanced by historians and anthropologists
representing aboriginal communities.3 My own interest lies in a different direction, in
analysing how current social and political forces foster public debates regarding the
history of European-aboriginal relations. These debates reveal opposed interpretations
of how relationships between the state and Canada’s aboriginal population should be
managed. The case known as R. v Donald Marshall Jr. in which three professional
historians testified illustrates this process.
That the charges against Donald Marshall Jr. proceeded to trial reflected various
factors which converged between 1993 and 1996: the nature of the charges, the
response of the federal government to changes in the aboriginal fishery, the internal
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social and political dynamics then current within the Mi’kmaq community and the
government decision to charge Donald Marshall Jr.
First, there was the alleged offence. The charges stemmed from observations made
by a DFO officer in August 1993. The officer’s written report was not disputed by the
Defence and was later used as the basis of an agreed statement of facts submitted by
both parties to the Court. According to this statement, at around ten o’clock on the
morning of 24 August 1993, Donald Marshall Jr., a Mi’kmaq resident of Membertou
reserve in Cape Breton,4 his common-law wife, Jane MacMillan, and Peter Martin of
Listiguj5 were fishing for eels in Pomquet Harbour, located on the northern shore of
mainland Nova Scotia, just east of Antigonish. Using ‘fyke nets’, a type of fixed net,
the three transferred the eels to a holding pen situated on lands belonging to the
Mi’kmaq community of Afton. At about 1:10 p.m., Mr. Marshall “helped weigh and
load his eels onto a truck belonging to Southshore Trading Company Limited of Port
Elgin, New Brunswick”. This company purchases and sells fish. Later the truck was
stopped by DFO officers and was found to contan 463 pounds of eels. As a result Mr.
Marshall, Ms. MacMillan, and Mr. Martin were charged with three offences under the
Maritime Provinces Fishery Regulations. First, the three were accused of fishing eels
without a licence contrary to section 4(1) of the Fishery Regulations. This regulation
states that “no person shall fish for or catch and retain any fish a) unless the person is
authorized to do so under the authority of a licence issued under these Regulations,
the Fishery [General] Regulations or the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences
Regulations”. Second, the three were accused with fishing “during the closed time for
eels with eel nets, which were not dip nets, contrary to s. 20 of the Regulations”.
Third, they were accused of selling eels “which had not been caught and retained
under a licence issued for the purpose of commercial fishing or such other licence as
provided in s. 35 92) of the Fisheries Regulations”. This section of the Maritime
Provinces Fishery Regulations outlaws selling or bartering fish without a licence
issued by DFO or a licence issued under the Aboriginal Communal Fishing Licences
Regulations. In contravening these regulations, the three were charged with
committing an offence under s. 78(a), an “offence punishable on summary conviction
are liable, for the first offence, to a fine not exceeding one hundred thousand
dollars...or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year, or to both”.6 Over the
next several months, the federal government dropped all charges against Ms.
MacMillan and Mr. Martin but not against Mr. Marshall.
The second factor which contributed to the case proceeding to trial was the
Mi’kmaq community’s resentment of the government’s attempts to minimize their
peoples’ economic needs. The charges against Mr. Marshall had been laid during the
initial stages of a crisis in the Atlantic fishery, a time when the federal government
was being criticized for mismanaging the fishery. This crisis likely contributed to
government insistence that Mi’kmaq communities adhere to the DFO’s regulatory
system and heightened government concern about individuals such as Mr. Marshall
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who were not.7 This was a particular problem since the Mi’kmaq community felt that
DFO had deliberately shut them out of the fishery ever since the introduction of the
licensing system in 1976. Though unwilling to relax its control, the federal
government had made tentative attempts in 1992 to include the Mi’kmaq in the
commercial fishery, in the form of the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy [AFS]. This
program had been launched, however, not because of government initiative but as a
result of a Supreme Court decision in 1990.8 In R. v Sparrow, the Court had ruled that
aboriginal people in Canada had a right to fish for subsistence or ceremonial purposes,
a right that superseded that of all other members of society. This right, said the Court,
could be limited or curtailed but the onus was upon the government to demonstrate
how and why this limitation should be enforced.9 In 1993, however, at least two
Mi’kmaq communities had refused to sign a licensing agreement under the AFS
programme: Membertou, the place of Mr. Marshall’s official residence and Afton, the
location where he and the others were fishing for eels in August 1993.10
Both Afton and Membertou were wary that in signing a licensing agreement and
accepting federal jurisdiction, they would be undermining their treaty and aboriginal
rights, a point they thought would later be used to impose unilateral regulations in any
future negotiations regarding the fishery.11 For both these communities, the Sparrow
decision in 1990 had demonstrated that the government was unwilling to implement
further changes to an aboriginal fisheries program without direction from the Supreme
Court. Indeed, the decision provided hope that the Court might rule favourably on a
case involving the commercial fishery. While a court case in British Columbia
focusing upon this issue was already on appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant
there was not covered by treaty and thus had based her claim on an aboriginal right.12
The Mi’kmaq of Nova Scotia, however, had signed a series of treaties with British
colonial officials which they believed established the parameters in which their
relations with European governments should be governed.13 Thus, after Mr. Marshall
Acadiensis10
7 DFO commercial fishing policies for the period in which the alleged offense occurred can be found
in Commercial Fisheries Licensing Policy for Eastern Canada (Ottawa, 1992).
8 For an explanation of this program, see Melvin H. Smith, Q.C., Our Home or Native Land? What
Governments’ Aboriginal Policy is Doing to Canada ([1995] Toronto, 1996), p. 207; Bruce H.
Wildsmith, “The Mi’kmaq and the Fishery: Beyond Food Requirements”, Dalhousie Law Journal 18,
2 (Fall 1995), pp. 137-40.
9 R. v Sparrow, [1990], 3 Canadian Native Law Reporter, pp. 160-87; Thomas Isaac, “Balancing
Rights: The Supreme Court of Canada, R. v Sparrow and the Future of Aboriginal Rights”, Canadian
Journal of Native Studies, XIII, 2 (1993), pp. 199-219; Wildsmith, “The Mi’kmaq and the Fishery”,
pp. 126-32.
10 Because he is a Mi’kmaq resident of Nova Scotia, Marshall’s hearing is recognized under the Indian
Act. This Act distinguishes between those people, like Marshall, who are of aboriginal ancestry and
those who have lost their “status”. The latter are known as “non-status”. However, the criteria used
by the government have been and continue to be a subject of controversy. For instance, before 1985,
women who married non-aborignal men lost their “status”. See, Enough is Enough: Aboriginal
Women Speak Out as Told to Janct Silman (Toronto, 1987).
11 This was the subject of a protracted argument between the Atlantic Region chiefs and DFO lawyers
at an informal meeting in Dartmouth, Nova Scotia in May 1993 at which I was present.
12 The Supreme Court has since delivered judgement. See R. v Vanderpeet, [1996], 4 Canadian Native
Law Reporter, pp. 177-216.
13 Donald Marshall Sr., Alexander Denny and Simon Marshall, “The Covenant Chain”, in Boyce
Richardson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and Renewal in Indian Country (Toronto, 1989), pp. 73-104.
was charged in October 1993, the two organizations representing the 13 reserves in
Nova Scotia, the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs and the Union of Nova Scotia
Indians, agreed to finance his defence.
At least four factors may have influenced the Union and Confederacy to defend
Mr. Marshall. These were first, a renewed commitment between the two umbrella
organizations representing status Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia to forge a united political
front, second, the particular historical context in which the 18th-century treaties were
made which strengthened their constitutional appeal, third the community’s logistical
ability to mount a defence and finally the identity of the accused, Donald Marshall Jr.
During the months preceding the charges, the two umbrella organizations
representing status Mi’kmaq in Nova Scotia had resolved some of their differences
and had begun a tentative program of cooperation. This was an important political
development since it reversed more than a decade of turmoil in Mi’kmaq politics,
beginning in 1984 when some mainland communities had resigned their membership
in the union and had formed the Confederacy. This had created two separate political
factions operating parallel to each other. By the early 1990s, however, both
government reluctance to fund two organizations and the community’s realization that
political disunity limited their ability to influence policy decisions precipitated a
greater degree of political cooperation. The Aboriginal Title Project, which began
operation in July 1993 and for which I began work in October of that year, was one
such venture. This renewed sense of unity was critical in buttressing the community’s
ability to withstand government pressures prior to the trial’s commencement in
November 1994. Government pressure involved attempts to influence the Mi’kmaq to
drop their defense of Marshall, a tactical manoeuvre which may have stemmed from
internal disagreements among federal departments regarding the advisability of
litigating the case.14 Despite these pressures, lawyers representing both organizations
were advised to prepare a defence of Mr. Marshall based upon his treaty right to fish
and sell fish.
The determination by the Union and the Confederacy to go to trial was based upon
a belief that Mr. Marshall stood a good chance of winning any subsequent court case.
While the community had long argued that the treaties were the foundation of their
relationships with other peoples, governments and the judiciary had either ignored or
discounted any of the treaties signed between the British Crown and the Mi’kmaq
until the Supreme Court’s decision in R. v Simon. As the understanding of these 18th-
century agreements by governments and the courts have evolved since 1985, the
Mi’kmaq leadership’s own sense of the treaties’ importance has been reinforced.
Increased attention to the treaties has also highlighted the community’s unique legal
position within Canada, bolstering the leadership’s willingness to contest policy
decisions which they believe undermine treaty relationships.
This unique legal position is due principally to the historical context within which
the treaties were negotiated. Unlike the later treaties signed with Western aboriginal
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peoples, the Mi’kmaq treaties were negotiated before 1780 or prior to the two events
that transformed the legal framework in which treaty relationships were made with
aboriginal peoples in British North America. These milestones were the Loyalist
exodus from the United States after 1780 and the industrialization of the Canadian
economy during the 1800s. One development resulting from these two transformative
processes was that henceforward treaties negotiated with aboriginal peoples involved
the surrender of lands.15 As well they included language suggesting the curtailment of
certain economic activities sometime in the future. This, however, was generally not
true of treaties signed before 1780 as these agreements were negotiated within a
political and economic framework which encouraged peoples like the Mi’kmaq to
continue supplying furs for Britain’s mercantile economy. Though the British signed
treaties with other aboriginal groups before 1780, the vast majority were with peoples
who were later integrated into the United States. For this reason, there are only a few
aboriginal communities now living within the borders of the Canadian state who
signed treaties with the British Crown before 1780. In sum, this context provides the
Mi’kmaq with a more solid basis than most other aboriginal communities to argue that
the language found in their treaties requires a liberal interpretive model since the
treaties were negotiated during an economic conjuncture when British officials were
unconcerned with modifying the internal political structure of Mi’kmaq society. The
practical effect of this within the contemporary political landscape fueled the
determination of Mi’kmaq leadership to defend Mr. Marshall.
The third factor influencing the decision to defend Mr. Marshall was that at the
time the charges were laid, both the Confederacy and the Union had the ability to
compile the historical documentation necessary for mounting a credible defence.
Here, the establishment of the Treaty and Aboriginal Rights Research [TARR] Centre
at Shubenacadie in August 1992, and second, the commencement of the Aboriginal
Title Project in July 1993, made that task possible. The TARR centre was a research
body associated with the Union of Nova Scotia Indians. The research conducted by
individuals in both organizations was helpful in assembling the documentation for the
defense.16
A fourth and final factor leading to the trial was that the accused was Donald
Marshall Jr., an individual who symbolized to the Mi’kmaq community the inherent
injustice of the Canadian judicial system. In 1971, Mr. Marshall, then 17 years old,
was convicted for the murder of Sandy Seale and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Marshall declared his innocence. The Mi’kmaq community believed him and over the
following several years pressed for the case to be re-opened. Finally, in 1982 after 11
years in prison, Mr. Marshall was found innocent following an investigation that
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concluded that Seale had been murdered by Roy Ebsary.17 The Nova Scotia
government later established a Royal Commission which in 1989 recommended a
restructuring of the judicial system to ensure that similar miscarriages of justice did
not hurt other minority members of the province. Though I do not know precisely why
Mr. Marshall chose to ignore DFO regulations, his actions and the decision to support
his treaty right to the commercial fishery illustrate a persistent trend since the 1970s
in how the Mi’kmaq community perceives itself and its relationship with provincial
and federal governments. No longer willing to see their people become victimized in
the same manner as Mr. Marshall had been in 1971, community members have
actively sought political solutions to provide a better economic future for their youth.
This includes providing employment in the fishery.
If the subsequent trial was contentious, it was because opposing social and political
forces — representing the federal government on the one hand and the Mi’kmaq
community on the other — had imperceptibly made their way into the court room.
Key players on both sides had decided that litigation was the only way to resolve their
differences, despite numerous discussions since the charges were first filed in October
1993. The Defence understood the history of Mi’kmaq-European relations to be one
in which Mi’kmaq lands had been confiscated and their rights eroded, leading to an
economic dependence upon government agencies. For the Defence, these rights had
not been legally undermined by the treaties made with the British Crown and so the
trial could be viewed as a means to regain some community control over the fishery.
In contrast, the federal government focused upon the compromises made by the
Mi’kmaq in their treaty relationships with settler governments as a result of the
immigration of European peoples to North America in the 17th and 18th centuries.
This emigration had ultimately forced communities to accept the legal and political
jurisdiction of the British government to ensure their own survival. Thus, according
to the federal government, any changes to the fishery could only be implemented
through DFO. Implicitly, however, this policy was premised upon protecting the
property rights of the non-Mi’kmaq population, and therefore any unlicensed fishing
was viewed as a threat to the public interest. These opposing opinions collided in the
courtroom. Though professional historians were the only witnesses, the trial was less
about them than about how their historical opinions related to differing societal
opinions regarding how the state should manage its relations with indigenous peoples.
The trial was heard before His Honour Judge John D. Embree of the Nova Scotia
Provincial Court. Because of difficulties in finding trial dates convenient to all sides,
it was held in selected blocks of time between November 1994 and February 1996.
Though the onus was upon the Defence to prove why Marshall should not be subject
to federal statutes, the Crown agreed to present its evidence first when the trial began
on Monday, 21 November 1994.
The legal team representing the federal government was composed of Michael
Paré, a Halifax-based employee of the Atlantic Regional Office of the federal
Department of Justice, and Ian MacRae, then an Ottawa Lawyer with DFO. In
prosecuting Marshall, the government relied exclusively upon the testimony of
Professor Stephen Patterson from the University of New Brunswick. Professor
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Patterson was initially on the stand for nine days, which included eight days of direct
examination by Mr. Paré and one day of cross-examination by the Defence.18
However, since the Crown had introduced its evidence first, it had the opportunity to
respond to the Defence’s evidence after the completion of their case. So Professor
Patterson again took the stand almost a year after his initial appearance, testifying
from 10 to 13 October 1995.
The Defense team was composed of Bruce Wildsmith, a Dalhousie law professor,
who has provided legal representation for the Union of Scotia Indians for the past 20
years, and Eric Zscheile, lawyer for the Confederacy of Mainland Micmacs since
1992. Professor John G. Reid of Saint Mary’s University and I testified for the
Defence. Professor Reid’s testimony lasted seven days during the early weeks of May,
which included five days of direct examination by Mr. Wildsmith and two days of
cross-examination by Mr. Paré. After the completion of Professor Reid’s testimony, I
took the stand, testifying for 14 and one-half days, ten and one-half days of direct
examination and four and one-half days of cross-examination.19
Collectively, the testimony of the three historians took 34 days and filled more than
4,000 pages of transcripts. Most of this testimony focused upon the historical
documents submitted to the court by both parties. These evidence books constituted
the most important component of the trial, as they addressed the respective positions
advanced by each side. The Crown submitted five volumes containing 141 documents
given to the Defence two weeks prior to Professor Patterson’s initial testimony on 21
November 1994. The Defence, on the other hand, submitted 231 documents contained
in nine bound volumes.20 Though an initial multi-volume set of documents had been
given to the Crown on 20 March 1995, a large number of these were later deleted and
a final bundle provided to the Crown one week prior to the beginning of Professor
Reid’s testimony on 8 May 1995.
Much of the Crown’s documentation dealt with the political and economic context
in which the treaties of 1752 and 1760/61 were negotiated. The Crown’s focus upon
this period stemmed directly from pre-trial discussions in which Mr. Wildsmith and
Mr. Zscheile had stated that the Defence would rely upon the 1752 and 1760/61
treaties.21 The Crown’s documents came from three principal archival sources, the
correspondence of British colonial officials based in Nova Scotia, the minutes of
Nova Scotia’s Council and letters sent to Versailles by French officials at
Louisbourg.22 These documents tended to focus the Court’s attention on an
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interpretative model emphasizing the gradual economic dependency of Mi’kmaq
communities upon European, and specifically, French colonial society. This emphasis
provided the foundation therefore to argue that with the final defeat of New France in
1760, Mi’kmaq choices were constrained by their need for access to European goods.
This, according to Professor Patterson, was the context in which the treaties signed in
1760 and 1761 should be understood. For instance, one of the key passages of the
1760/61 treaties reads:
And I do further engage that we will not traffic, barter or exchange any
commodities in any manner, but with persons, the managers of such truck-
houses as shall be appointed by His Majesty’s Governor at Fort Cumberland,
or elsewhere, in Nova Scotia or Acadia.23
The methodological problem posed in interpreting this passage, the meaning of which
was contested by both sides, is whether it can or should be read literally. Professor
Patterson addressed this problem in his testimony. Though recognizing the inherent
difficulties of translating European legal concepts into the Mi’kmaq language,
Professor Patterson emphasized that more than 200 years of contact had meant some
individuals were capable of translating from French and English into Mi’kmaq and
vice versa. More importantly, the community’s erstwhile ally, France, had been
defeated in battle by Great Britain, its forces scattered and vanquished. This,
according to Professor Patterson, would have left no doubt in the minds of the
Mi’kmaq community of the power of the British military to enforce its will upon
others. Therefore, according to this interpretation, in 1760/61 the Mi’kmaq
surrendered to the British, accepting what terms they could to guarantee their own
survival. In doing so, they acted pragmatically, making the best deal they possibly
could under difficult circumstances.24
The documents collected and submitted by the Defence historians contested this
viewpoint, supporting an argument that the political and military superiority of the
British was less overwhelming than suggested in Professor Patterson’s testimony.
This argument was also supported by various documents but encompassed a broader
spatial and temporal space than did the Crown’s submission. Our purpose was to
provide the Court with an understanding of the historical context of Mi’kmaq-
European relations which preceded and followed the crucial treaty-making period of
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the 1750s and early 1760s. Thus the Defence’s documentation focused first upon
New-England-Abenaki relations between 1678 and 1727, arguing that the political
and legal relationships made by the Abenaki — allies and neighbours of the Mi’kmaq
— laid the foundation for the treaties made with the Mi’kmaq.25 This viewpoint
formed the basis of the testimony of Professor Reid who noted, for instance, that four
Penobscot,26 who had been delegated to represent the Mi’kmaq and other
neighbouring peoples in discussions with Lieutenant-Governor William Dummer of
Massachusetts, negotiated the first Mi’kmaq treaty in 1726.27 Secondly, we focussed
upon an evolving relationship between the Mi’kmaq and the British, one which did
not begin in 1752 or in 1760 but rather had been initiated soon after the conquest of
Port Royal by New England forces in 1710. Thus, the Mi’kmaq, like the Abenaki, had
negotiated a series of agreements with British authorities, each one becoming the
foundation for later discussions, a relationship formally begun in 1726. Finally, we
used documentary evidence to stress that Mi’kmaq communities were less integrated
into European economic, social, and political structures than suggested in Professor
Patterson’s testimony. It followed that when the treaties of 1760/61 were negotiated
the Mi’kmaq were not as vulnerable militarily as Professor Patterson had suggested.
For all of these reasons, Professor Reid and I argued that determining the Mi’kmaq
understanding of their treaty relationship was difficult and required reconstruction of
the cultural context in which Mi’kmaq relationships with other peoples were mediated
between 1726 and 1761. This reconstruction led us to conclude, for instance, that the
treaties should not be read literally. Rather, we argued that different cultural meanings
were attached to certain passages, particularly those that involved conceptual terms,
such as “submission” or which were at variance with established patterns of economic
and political behaviour in Mi’kmaq society.28 I particularly disagreed with Professor
Patterson’s interpretation of the truckhouse clause found in the 1760/61 treaties
quoted above. I was not convinced that Mi’kmaq would have interpreted the clause as
meaning that they could only trade at truckhouses established by the British colonial
government. Rather, I argued that the clause regulated the British side of the trade but
not the Mi’kmaq side.29
In summary, the historical issues in the trial focused on different opinions
regarding relationships which evolve between pre-state and state societies. Professor
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Reid and I differed with Professor Patterson on three important issues: first, on the
power of the British state and its ability to enforce its jurisdiction over indigenous
communities; second, on the influence of European contact and settlement in
restructuring indigenous institutions; and third on the capacity of European and
indigenous communities to arrive at a mutual understanding of their legal relationship.
While Professor Patterson emphasized the integration of the Mi’kmaq into European
norms of behaviour, we stressed that the Mi’kmaq had resisted integration and
struggled to preserve their identity and economic independence.
While these were the historical problems debated at trial, at issue as well were
different visions of how this history should be integrated into the existing
constitutional relationships between aboriginal communities and the Canadian state.
The position advanced by the Crown’s lawyers appeared consistent with the view that
the essence of the democratic state is that no one person or group of people should
enjoy special privileges or rights. In this context the 18th-century treaties could be
regarded as laying the foundation for the integration of the Mi’kmaq into a nascent
state structure which in the future would mediate contending interests for the benefit
of the general public. In contrast, the position advanced by the Defence was that the
Canadian state’s power could be seen as historically based upon the expropriation of
lands inhabited and used by aboriginal peoples. In terms of the Mi’kmaq, this transfer
of land was never formally or legally transacted. Thus, one interpretation of this
historical argument might be that the state does not act in the best interests of the
Mi’kmaq community since its economic and political power in the Atlantic region has
been based upon dispossessing the Mi’kmaq of their lands.
The trial judge found Donald Marshall Jr. guilty as charged. The decision was
appealed to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal which upheld Mr. Marshall’s conviction
in a unanimous decision handed down in March 1997. The Supreme Court of Canada
then agreed to hear the appeal. Oral arguments were made to seven Justices headed by
Chief Justice Lamer on 5 November 1998.30 The Court’s ruling is expected sometime
in 1999, or almost six years after the initial charges were laid against Mr. Marshall.
One of the immediate consequences of the trial has been to spark further academic
debate regarding opposed interpretations of Canada’s history and how this past should
be integrated into our Constitution. Now the challenge is to broaden the scope of this
debate into the public realm, among both aboriginal communities and the non-
aboriginal public. This may facilitate a political process that will resolve these
contentious historical, legal and political issues.
WILLIAM C. WICKEN
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30 The case was heard by C. J. Lamer as well as by Justices Binney, Cory, Gonthier, Iacobucci,
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